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No Democracy For Devils
Democratic citizenship between interests 
and justice
Chiara Destri, University of Milan, PhD Student
Aim of the presentation
• Question: What kind of people are fit for a democracy? Can 
they be ‘devils’ or must they be ‘gods’?
• Focus: on the theories of Rawls and Christiano  to better 
understand the roles of personal interest and public concerns
“The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, 
can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are 
intelligent.” – I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch
“If there were a nation of gods, it would be governed 
democratically” – J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract 
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Outline of the presentation 
1. Justification for democracy & theories of liberal democratic 
citizenship
2. Three examples: minimalist, ‘objectivist’ and constructive 
proceduralisms
3. The justice-first approach: the case of John Rawls
1. Reasonableness
2. Public reasons
4. The interests-based approach: Thomas Christiano
1. Fundamental interests
2. Egalitarian standpoint
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Justifications of democracy…
Instrumentalism
• Enhancing quality of 
outcomes
• Improving citizens’ 
competence and 
motivation
Proceduralism
• Pure/imperfect procedures
• Expressing certain values, like 
freedom, equality, etc…
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… And democratic citizenship
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A certain justification of 
democracy in terms of its 
constitutive values or of the 
quality of its outcomes
• Higher level of the justification of 
democratic authority and 
democratic institutions
A given theory of 
democratic citizenship as 
moral requirements 
(duties, obligation, 
virtues) that citizens must 
display in order for the 
democratic system to 
work
• Lower level of public morality 
and citizens’ political actions
Ex. 1: minimalist proceduralism
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• Political 
preferences 
≠ economic 
preferences
• Inconsistent 
justification 
based on 
freedom and 
self-interest Minimalist 
proceduralism
Minimalist 
citizenship
Compliance with 
laws, BUT NO 
other moral or 
political 
requirement
Democratic 
procedures as a 
set of rules of the 
game for the 
aggregation of 
individuals’ actual 
preferences
Ex. 2: ‘objectivist’ proceduralism
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• To what 
extent are 
citizens 
morally 
asked to 
accept the 
right 
justification 
of 
democracy?
• ‘Intrinsic’ 
justification: 
democracy is 
morally right, 
whether 
democratic 
citizens see it 
or not
‘Objectivist’ 
proceduralism
‘Objectivist’ 
citizenship
Moral duty to act 
justly and do 
whatever it 
takes* to ensure 
that democracy 
works
Democratic 
procedures as a 
decision-making 
procedures that 
best respects 
individuals’ 
political equality
Ex. 3: constructive proceduralism
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• Citizens 
required to 
be both 
rational and 
reasonable 
in order to 
accept the 
public 
conception 
of justice
• Public 
justification 
of the 
publicly 
shared 
conception of 
justice Constructive 
proceduralism
Reasonable 
citizenship
Willingness to 
regard others as 
free and equal 
and to 
acknowledge the 
burdens of 
judgment
Democracy* as a 
fair system of 
social cooperation 
among free and 
equal citizens
Rawls: the justice-first approach
• Democratic citizens of a well-ordered society: “free and equal, 
rational and reasonable”
• Reasonableness = both a disposition and a virtue
• “the capacity for a sense of justice is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to normally be moved by an effective 
desire to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the 
principles of justice as the fair terms of social cooperation”
(PL, p. 302, italic added)
• Moral side = reciprocity
• Epistemic side = burdens of judgment
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What does reasonableness entail?
• To be willing to propose and accept fair terms of cooperation
• To acknowledge the burdens of judgment  the priority of 
the right over the good
• To recognize other fellow citizens as free and equal
• To propose in the public sphere reasons that others may 
reasonably accept  public reasons!
• Constitutional essentials and basic justice VS. matters 
of ordinary politics
• Is this distinction conspicuous?
• Comprehensive doctrines of the good:
• Compatible with the political conception of justice
• Excluded per se as legitimate public reasons
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Why to require reasonableness?
Democratic 
citizens as free 
and equal
Rationality and 
reasonableness
Well-ordered 
society as a fair 
system of 
cooperation
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Is it convincing?
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Congruence and 
moral 
psychology in TJ
Internalism of 
reasons in PL 
(assumed, but 
unavailable)
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Believing in 
freedom and 
equality DOES 
NOT imply 
being 
reasonable
What if I don’t 
think the 
Original 
Position to be a 
good model for 
justice? D
e
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ss
Democratic 
citizens must 
always 
prioritize the 
political 
conception of 
justice over 
their 
comprehensive 
doctrines
They must 
politically act on 
the principles of 
justice
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Ex. 4: Christiano’s case
DIPARTIMENTO DI STUDI                                                 
SOCIALI E POLITICI
Chiara Destri, University of Milan, PhD Student
• Citizens 
allowed to 
publicly 
express their 
own  
consideratio
ns of justice 
and the good
• Public 
justification 
of democracy 
grounded on 
the principle 
of political 
equality
Interest-based 
justification of 
democracy
Interested 
citizenship?
NO requirement 
of 
reasonableness
Democracy as the 
public and equal 
advancement of 
the interests of 
all
What are the fundamental interests?
• Three fundamental interests as conditions of well-being in 
social life:
1. The interest in correcting one’s own cognitive bias
2. The interest in being at home in the world
3. The interest in having recognized one’s own moral standing 
as equal
• All immaterial interests
• All universal interests
• All normative interests
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The egalitarian standpoint
• Egalitarian standpoint: “we now ask what everyone would 
agree to when they are properly informed and 
conscientiously trying to figure out what equality implies for 
society” (CE, 69)  3 features:
1. Taking each person’s interests into account
2. Figuring out what equality demands
3. Taking the background ‘facts of judgment’ into account 
• Justification based on the egalitarian standpoint: in order to 
be public it should be undertaken by citizens when assessing 
reciprocal claims
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Citizens’ assumed disposition
• Egalitarian and objective standpoint on justice  other 
fundamental interests cannot be incompatible with the 
principle of public equality
• Which kind of disposition citizens should display in the 
political domain?
“They desire that the society they live in be just and the 
interests of each be advanced in the context of the advance of 
the interests of all.” (CE 86)
“To the extent that citizens genuinely try to learn from one 
another and attempt to discern the most defensible ideas, 
citizens show that they desire to advance morally 
desirable aims.” (CE 190)  
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A comparison between gods… 
Rawls Christiano
Moral justification based on a 
conception of justice  agreement on 
the public conception of justice = 
required
Moral justification based on 
individuals’ interests weak 
publicity
Conception of justice = precondition 
for a well-ordered society where 
anyone can follow her own 
conception of the good
Egalitarian standpoint = precondition 
for individuals’ forming and 
developing their other particular 
interests
Citizens = required to be reasonable 
in order to agree on the conception of 
justice
Citizens = required to acknowledge 
the egalitarian standpoint when 
debating about justice
Preliminary conclusion
No 
requirements 
at all: citizens 
as they are
?
Demanding 
idea of 
citizenship as 
the capacity to 
be reasonable 
(Rawls) or to 
assume the 
egalitarian 
standpoint 
(Christiano)
Very 
demanding 
idea of 
citizenship as 
moral 
commitment 
to realize 
justice
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Thank you!
